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We analyze the decision to participate and Olympic performance at the
country level. We use an unbalanced panel of 118 countries over 24 editions
of the Olympic Summer Games. The main focus of the paper is on
economic, geographic and demographic explanations of Olympic
participation and success. We estimate the impact of income per capita,
population size, home advantage, and institutional variables on participation
and success rates. We present separate results for events before the Second
World War and after. These results show that income is an important
determinant of Olympic participation and success. Socialist countries send
more athletes to the games and have more success in medal counts. The
home advantage has become less prominent.
                                                          
1 Gerard Kuper: g.h.kuper@eco.rug.nl, Elmer Sterken: e.sterken@eco.rug.nl1 Introduction
In ancient times in the valley of Olympia in southwestern Greece the
Olympic Games were held every four years. From 776 B.C. it took more
than 1100 years until Emporer Theodosius of Rome considered them to be
pagan and decided to forbid the games in 393 A.D. Baron Pierre de
Coubertin proposed a revival of the games in 1892. He succeeded in his
initiative and since 1896 the modern Olympics games have been organized.
Despite wars and boycotts the games survive political struggles and are
generally considered to be the top sports event around the globe.
At the very first editions of the Summer Games competition was not fierce
in most of the events. Participating was more important than winning.
Especially the richer countries (sometimes represented by wealthy athletes)
participated and collected medals. Gradually winning became more
important and competition increased. In 1936 the Olympic Games were even
politicized by Nazi Germany. Not the individual performance but the
national performance was in the focal point of attention. After the Second
World War the Olympic Games were even subordinated to the Cold War
policies. But the most important change of the games is the globalization of
participation and competition through improvement of economic conditions
around the world. In this paper we analyze this development of the Olympic
Summer Games.
The ultimate goal of our analysis is the construction of a model that forecasts
future distributions of Olympic medals across nations. In that respect we
analyze medal counts as a proxy of national performance. Gets a country it
“fair” share of the medals? How can we define a fair share?  Is there a home
advantage? Is the home advantage decreasing because of the increase of
competition? What’s the impact of different population growth figures
across the world? Are political regimes relevant? Is emancipation important?
How can we proxy for the effect of a societal positive attitude for sports? To
that extent we analyze all the 24 versions of the modern Summer Olympic
Games since 1896. We include 118 countries that were able to win a medal
at least once at the games. We do not include the Winter Games, since these
games have serious bias in the selection of competing countries. We also do
not include countries that never won a medal. This creates a selectivity bias.
So we are not able to analyze the issue of participating at the games or not,
but we can analyze the problem of how many athletes a country should send
to the games.What is the relevance of a study like this? There are several things to be
learned in our opinion. First, a lot of countries seem to consider the decision
to organize a future edition of the games. Implicitly they assume that the net
benefits of organizing the Olympic Games are bigger than the costs. The
costs are mostly huge, and the benefits are not all that clear. In most cost-
benefit analyses decision-makers include a net present value of future
increases of economic activity through consumer optimism. The increase in
consumer optimism is mostly related with success at the games. Being the
host country an estimate of future medal potential is helpful. Secondly, a lot
of the National Olympic Committees predict their medal tallies before the
games. Their methodology is mostly based on summing the probabilities of
winning medals in individual events. Based on those estimates and the final
results of the games, decisions on government financing sports are based.
We base our predictions on national data and consider the portfolio of
medals leading to lower forecast errors. On the other hand we can estimate
the “normal” medal returns, indicating outperformance of an individual
NOC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review
the literature on modeling national Olympic performance. In section 3 we
introduce the data. In section 4 we present the models and the estimation
results. We conclude with a summary and conclusions.
2  Olympic literature
There are two strands of literature on the analysis of Olympic performance
at the national level. First there is an extensive literature on the analysis of
medal tallies of individual events. Who did actually win the Olympic Games
if we correct for variable A and Variable B? Popular variables to deflate
medal totals with are population size and national income. For each event
the winner of the newly weighed results can be computed. The second strand
of the literature is more interesting and tries to model Olympic performance
based on multiple events. We review this type of literature more extensively.
For the post-World War II games sociologists and economist analyzed the
impact of social and economic conditions on the results. Examples of these
studies are  Ball (1972), Grimes et al. (1974) and Levine (1974).  Strange
enough this literature did not develop further until the 1990’s. An
explanation of this might be that in the 1970’s and 1980’s the Olympic
Games were troubled by the Cold War. As known the USA did notparticipate at the Moscow 1980 games, while the USSR did not show up at
the Los Angeles 1984 games. The first study that restarts the performance
analysis is Slughart et al (1993), who analyze the problem for transitional
economies. Recently two studies, by Johnson and Ali (2000) and Bernard
and Busse (2000), relived the attention for this issue. Our paper is in line
with those two studies. We give special attention to Johnson and Ali (2000)
and Bernard and Busse (2000).
In general the literature shows that population size, income per capita, the
home advantage, and a socialist/communist tradition have a major impact on
the medal counts. Population size is the fundamental determinant of medal
success. A larger population increases the group of potential athletes. There
is a debate on the impact of a larger population on performance though. A
country like India has a large population but relatively low success rate at
the Games. Bangladesh is the country with the largest population that never
won a medal. Another issue in this respect is that countries with large groups
of talented athletes are not allowed to send them all. For most events there
are participation limits. So the relation between population and Olympic
success is a complicated one.
The second determinant found is income per capita. A higher income allows
a country to specialize in sports, to train athletes better, to provide better
medical care, to send a larger group of athletes to the games, etc. In the
Olympic history the richer countries have participated at many more events
than developing countries. As we will show later on, income per capita was
a crucial determinant at the first editions of the Games. There is evidence
that the costs of transport and medical care, etc decreased over time, which
enables even poor countries to send delegates.
The third determinant is the home advantage. It helps to send more athletes
and to get more support during the games. Each home country is allowed to
participate in all events. Moreover, the crowd of home spectators will
support the performing home athletes. Attention in the media puts further
pressure on the home athletes. It seems that at the recent versions of the
Games countries that will host the next version of the games perform better.
Korea doubled its medal share at the 1984 games and hosted the Olympics in
1988. Australia performed significantly better at the Atlanta Games in 1996.
And Greece doubled its medal normal share at the Sydney 2000 Games. This
is a time-to-build argument: it takes long run planning to create a group of
optimal performing athletes.The fourth determinant is the political system. There is large evidence that
communist countries perform better. Economies with central planning
allowed more specialization in sports. More national resources were used for
training and supporting athletes than in market-based economies. Moreover
sports were considered to be an instrument the increase the national
standing. Finally, there is the suspicion that socialist athletes used more
drugs than others. There is no serious proof though. Wallechinsky (2000)
reports the results of positive drug tests from 1968 up to and including the
1996 Games. Of the 48 positive drug tests at the Summer Games, only 15
cases involve athletes from communist countries.
Since the breakdown of the East-European communist systems things
changed a little. In the last decade economic development allowed also
market-based economies to specialize further in sports. The other issue is
that professional sports are more integrated with the Games since 1988. But
the former socialist countries are able to perform at a very high standard
despite the liberalization process. Examples are Russia, Romania, Poland
and Bulgaria.
A fifth determinant is the national sports culture. Is sport really a societal
activity? If so, a country is probably better able to use resources for training,
etc. If performance is accepted and appreciated by the public, athletes will
be stimulated more. This variable is hard to measure though and has not
been used by previous studies.
How is Olympic performance modeled? Johnson and Ali (2000) present two
types of models. First they estimate an equation for the number of
participants per country. They assume participation to be a quadratic
function of GDP per capita, population, the home advantage, a dummy
variable indicating immediate geographical proximity to the hosting nation,
a dummy variable indicating the political system, and variables indicating
former colonial links. Johnson and Ali present results for total participation
and female participation. They conclude on a data set that includes 138
countries and 1095 country-event observations since 1952 that a home
country almost doubles its participation and a neighbor country sends about
25% more athletes. A monarchy sends fewer athletes to the Games, and
rather surprisingly, communist countries do not send more competitors. Next
Johnson and Ali estimate performance. First the estimate the probability of
individual success using a similar specification as the model that explainsparticipation. Based on more than 60 thousand observations they find that
the homefield advantage adds twelve percent change of success. On the
national level (using again a model in absolute medals and quadratic in GDP
per capita and population, etc) the home advantage is estimated to be an
additional 25 medals, of which 12 are gold medals. Communist countries
outperform the others by 12 medals (5 gold medals).
Bernard and Busse (2000) estimate probit models for medal shares (note that
Johnson and Ali use absolute medal counts) using data for the events since
1960. First they use population shares. If a country was able to double its
population it would increase its medal share by 1.5% percentage point. Next
they specify a Cobb-Douglas production function for medal shares, using
population share and GDP-capita as production factors. Moreover they
include a dummy variable for the homefield advantage, a soviet-dummy and
a non-soviet but planned economy dummy. The home advantage is
estimated to be 1.2 percentage point medal share. The soviet dummy varies
between 3 and 6 percentage points. Bernard and Busse also estimate time-to-
build effects. These are found to be significant.
3  Data
We include data for all modern Olympic Summer games since 1896. This
implies that we include 24 events in our sample. On the one hand this
increases the number of observations compared to Johnson and Ali (2000)
and Bernard and Busse (2000). On the other hand this leads to more
problems in data collection (see below). Including the older versions of the
games might also bias the true current parameters. Therefore we use split-
samples to analyze differences through time. We collected the medal data
from Wallechinsky (2000) with the Yahoo Sports reports on the Sydney 200
Games. We included the 118 countries that won at least one medal at one of
the 24 events (we consider Bohemia to be the Czech Republic). A full listing
of the countries included is given in the Appendix. Table 1 gives an
overview of the modern Olympic Summer Games. The Table includes
information on the number of athletes, female participation, number of
countries represented at the games and the number of events held. The Table
shows that in the first ten editions of the games before the Second World
War 289 country-event observations are present.Data on participation by country are given by Kluge  (1981) for the Olympic
Games up to and including the Moscow 1980 games. For later editions of
the Games we used data from the Official Report of the Games (International
Olympic Committee, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000). We do not analyze
female participation and success separately.
Next we collected data on GDP. GDP data are typically hard to find for
some countries, especially for those not included in the sets of the
International Monetary Fund or World Bank. In our sample this typically
holds for Cuba, Monaco, and the Peoples Republic of Korea. The other
problem is the provision of consistent estimates of GDP before the Second
World War. We used Madisson (1995) for dollar weighed uniform priced
GDP. Madisson gives estimates for about 15 countries in our sample back to
1870. Of the 289 country-event observations of the first ten editions of the
games we are able to cover 209 using these GDP data. Madisson moreover
provides estimates for Cuba for short time intervals of the 20th century.
Data on population are provided by Madisson (1995) and by the World
Bank. The World Bank provides moreover a data set on development
indicators (see Easterly, 2000). We use this set for other geographical and
demographic data, such as longitude and latitude, land area, landlocked
indicator, female labor participation (in 1980), legal system dummies etc.
4  Model and estimation results
We estimate two models, as suggested by Johnson and Ali. First we estimate
participation. Next we model Olympic performance in terms of medal shares
for gold, silver and bronze, conditional on participation. We estimate the
model in a combined time-series cross-section form. First we use the events
as units, after that we use the countries as units to account for time-to-build
effects.
4.1  Participation
The dependent variable is PS(it), which represents the percentage of athletes
at game t (t=1,..,24) from country i (i=1,..,118). Modeling is shares avoids
problems of nonstationary data. Let P(it) be the absolute potential number of
athletes delegated by country i. Suppose now that each world citizen has an
equal probability to become a top athlete. In that case P(it) will be dependenton the size of the total population of a country at the time of the t-the edition
of the Summer Games POP(it).
There are several arguments valid why Olympic participation is not
proportional to the absolute size of the population. Suppose we have a
stochastic series X1,…, Xn which is identical independently standard normal
distributed N(0,1). The expected value of the supremum Xsup of all possible
outcomes is of order Ölog(n) (see Reiss, 1989). So it is likely that the
maximum performing individual of a population of size POP(it) will be of
the order  Ö log(POP(it). Since this result also holds at the world level, P(it)
will be determined by the square root of the log of population share
(POPS(it)).
Next we assume that income per capita (YS(it), in shares of total world
income) will determine the training and health conditions of the potential
athletes. Since it is likely that there are decreasing returns in income we have
the following potential delegation share:
P(it) = a Ölog(POPS(it)) + b log(YS(it)) + D(i)
Where D(i) represents country specific sports-cultural determinants. We
represent this variable by the following indicators. We use the system of
legal system indicators as proposed by La Porta et al. (1997). These authors
analyze legal differences across the world in financial economics. They
classify all legal systems into five classes:
·  Common Law: the Anglosaxon countries and their former colonies;
·  French Civil Law: southern Europa and Latin-America;
·  German Civil Law: Germany, central Europe, Japan, and others;
·  Scandinavian Civil Law;
·  Socialist countries: Soviet countries, China, Cuba.
Lensink et al. (2000) cross analyze the legal systems with societal variables
and show that societal norms and values are correlated with these legal
indicators. Another country-specific determinant is female labor
participation. Some countries do not allow women to work on religious
grounds. These countries typically have a lower rate of female emancipation
which reduces the potential set of athletes.
This potential share of athletes PS(it) is disturbed by two effects. First we
have the home advantage HOME(it) (=1 if country i hosts Games t, = 0 inother cases). Home countries are allowed to send more athletes. Secondly,
we have the distance to the Games. Especially in the first ten editions of the
Games and shortly after the Second World War the costs of sending athletes
could be high.
Table 2, 3, and 4 give the results for the participation regressions with event-
specific fixed effects. In Table 2 we give estimates using all 24 events. In
Table 3 presents sub-sample estimation results for pre- and post-World War
II events. Table 4 gives estimates for a specific sub-sample, 1960-1992,
where we are able to analyze the impact of media attention. Table 2 includes
results with common parameters for income per capita, population and
distance and with cross-section specific estimates. In the right-hand column
we list indicative values for the 12t
h and 24
th event. Table 2 shows that all
variables are significant. It appears that the home country sends about 4
percent more athletes to the games. Table 3 shows that before World War II
this percentage was even higher and reaches 16 percent. After World War II
the home advantage drops to 3.5 percent. Income per capita and the order of
the size of population determine participation. Especially after World War II
the legal systems matter, as is emancipation relevant. Distance is more
important before World War II. Table 4 gives the results with the same
specification, but including TV-sets per capita as an additional variable.
Although this variable is correlated with GDP per capita it might explain a
little more of the variance of participation via media attention. Indeed it
seems that countries with a large number of TV-sets send more athletes to
the Summer Games.
Table 5 presents the results for a reversed estimation using the countries as
cross-section units instead of the events. Now we can use 104 countries and
estimate for lagged effects in participation. Table 5 shows the results for the
whole sample, the editions after World War II and the same sample without
the cold-war games of Moscow and Los Angeles. Again we see a consistent
estimate of the home advantage of about 6 percent over the whole sample
and a little over 3 for the post-war data. Experimenting with more recent
sub-samples shows that the home advantage falls to a little under 2% in the
last editions of the games. For income per capita share we find typically
lower elasticities (about 0.1). The impact of population size was bigger on
the participation at the old games. The autoregressive term is about 0.2 to
0.3. We also estimated a model with a lead in participation. The lead
coefficient is found to be around 0.1. We note that these results are justillustrative, since we did not correct for the dynamics in the panel
regressions.
4.2 Success
In the previous section we modeled Olympic participation. Sending athletes
to the Summer Games depends on the income level of a country, population
size, legal regime, distance, emancipation, and media attention. Now we turn
to Olympic success in terms of winning medals. As we illustrate below, the
data clearly reveal that national medal success is dependent on participation.
The notion that participating is more important than winning is proven to be
untrue: participation is nowadays the crucial determinant of Olympic
success. Of course this is due to selection and qualification regulation. In
modeling Olympic success we therefore concentrate on determinants of
success given participation.
We model the share of medals (gold, silver, and bronze) as a function of the
participation share, the home advantage, the legal systems and income. The
home advantage relates to the home crowd that supports the home team. The
legal system relates to the fact that some countries might be more restrictive
and selective to sending athletes, leading to a higher average quality of the
team. In the country-specific regressions we include GDP per capita again as
an additional determinant to indicate a higher average quality of a national
team. Finally we include for the Rome 1960 to Barcelona 1992 Summer
Games the public media variable, TV-sets per capita, to indicate public
media pressure on athletic performance.
We have again two types of regressions: event-specific fixed effects, where
we can include variables indicating differences between countries, and
country-specific effects. Table 5 starts with the basic event-specific
regressions. The model includes the home advantage, participation, legal
systems and two dummy-variables for the USA and USSR. Since we include
all the events in these regressions we need to correct for the fact that due to
boycotts the US and USSR probably won more medals than normal. Table 6
shows that a one-percentage point increase in participation leads almost to a
homogeneous increase in medal success. The home advantage helps in
earning more gold medals, but not for silver, while there is even a negative
effect on bronze. One could argue that there is a shift from bronze to gold
for the home teams. French legal countries typically have less success at the
Summer Games.Table 7 includes the same model for the events after World War II. Here we
can observe that the participation effect is more important. The home
advantage vanishes, apart from the disadvantage for winning bronze. The
home advantage is fully due to sending more athletes to the games. Socialist
countries keep their advantage in winning medals, since their participation
starts after the Second World War. Scandinavian countries still win more
gold medals. The main conclusion is that the home advantage is less clear in
winning medals, but runs via participation.
Table 8 gives the country-fixed effect results. We include 4 panels in Table
8. Panel A gives the results for the whole sample, Panel B for the Pre-World
War II events, Panel C for the post-World War II events, and Panel D for the
last 4 editions of the Summer Games. We include the home advantage,
participation and GDP per capita shares as regressors in all models. We
experimented with lags but did not find significant results. Across all panels
participation is the single uniform significant determinant. Panel A shows
that the home advantage counts if we include all events for all types of
medals. Especially for the gold medals the home effect is strong. At the
recent editions of the games there is no significant direct home effect. Only
for the bronze medals the home effect matters at the last 4 editions (Panel
D).  Table 9 finally includes a model for the 1960-1992 editions of the
Summer Games with TV-sets as a determinant. We observe that for winning
gold and silver medals are sensitive for TV-attention. Again one has to note
that TV-sets and GDP per capita are correlated, so one cannot be conclusive
about the precise elasticities. From the sum of squared residuals one can
conclude that adding TV-sets helps in improving the fit of the model.
5  Conclusion
This paper analyzes Olympic participation and success at all the modern
editions of the Summer Games. Using a large data set including Olympic
statistics and income and demographic information we are able to explain
participation shares and medal success at the country level. First we model
participation, after that we show that conditional on participation we can
model success in the medal standings.
The following can be concluded. First, the economic condition of country
still is important for both participation and success. Secondly, the impact of
population size on participation is less clear. We use a statisticalapproximation of the supremum of a population. It seems to be the case that
the impact of population after the Second World War is less important than
before. The home effect is important, especially for participation. Here we
have a regulated effect, the home team is allowed to send more athletes. This
effect is still strong, but used to be more important at the old editions of the
games. Probably transport costs caused a bias to home representation. The
home advantage in success is less clear. For World War II the home
advantage was strong via participation and success. At the recent games the
home advantage shifted from gold to bronze. The legal tradition of a
country, as a proxy of the sports culture is relevant for modeling
participation and success. Especially socialist countries send more athletes
and earn more medals. French legal system countries perform less
impressive. Emancipation is found to be important. Finally, media attention
is important is explaining participation and success.
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ZimbabweTable 1 – Modern Olympic Summer Games
Year City Athletes Female   Countries Events
1896 Athens 245 0 14 43
1900 Paris 1118 21 28 75
1904 St Louis 627 6 12 84
1908 London 2023 44 22 109
1912 Stockholm 2490 55 28 102
1920 Antwerp 2668 77 29 154
1924 Paris 3070 125 44 126
1928 Amsterdam 3014 290 46 109
1932 Los Angeles 1328 127 37 116
1936 Berlin 3956 328 49 129
1948 London 4064 355 59 136
1952 Helsinki 4879 518 69 149
1956 Melbourne 3258 384 72 151
1960 Rome 5348 610 83 150
1964 Tokyo 5081 683 93 163
1968 Mexico City 5423 768 112 172
1972 Munich 7173 1058 121 195
1976 Montreal 6024 1246 92 198
1980 Moscow 5217 1124 80 203
1984 Los Angeles 6797 1567 140 221
1988 Seoul 8465 2189 159 237
1992 Barcelona 9370 2708 169 257
1996 Atlanta 10310 3513 197 271
2000 Sydney 11366 199 300
Source: D. Wallechinsky (2000), The Complete Book of the Summer
Olympics, Sydney 2000 Edition, The Overlook Press.Table 2 – Participation at the games – 24 editions
Dependent variable is the percentage participation share;
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist represents the social legal system, French the French Civil Law system,
Scandinavian the Scandinavian Civil Law system, German the German Civil Law
System;
Female labor participation is the percentage of female workers in the labor force in 1980;
GDP/POP is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total
GDP/capita of the 118 sample countries;
POP is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals.
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
In the cross-section specific estimation results we list event 12/event 24 results.
No cross-section Cross-section
specific terms specific terms





















# countries 98 98
#country-event 1084 1084Table 3 – Participation at the games – Subsample estimation results
Dependent variable is the percentage participation share;
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist represents the social legal system, French the French Civil Law system,
Scandinavian the Scandinavian Civil Law system, German the German Civil Law
System;
Female labor participation is the percentage of female workers in the labor force in 1980;
GDP/POP is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total
GDP/capita of the 118 sample countries;
POP is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals.
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
1896-1936 1948-2000





















# countries 37 98
# country-events 206 878Table 4 – Participation at the games – TV-sets
Dependent variable is the percentage participation share;
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist represents the social legal system, French the French Civil Law system,
Scandinavian the Scandinavian Civil Law system, German the German Civil Law
System;
Female labor participation is the percentage of female workers in the labor force in 1980;
GDP/POP is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total
GDP/capita of the 118 sample countries;
POP is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
TV-sets is the number of TV-sets per capita
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals.


























# country-events 567Table 5 – Participation at the games – Time-to-build
Dependent variable is the percentage participation share;
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
GDP/POP is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total
GDP/capita of the 118 sample countries;
POP is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
1900-2000 1948-2000 1948-1976/
1992-2000
Home advantage 6.454 3.293 3.250
(1.251) (0.342) (0.386)
log(GDP/POP) 0.067 0.112 0.116
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Ölog(100*POP) 0.999 0.444 0.270
(0.061) (0.025) (0.019)
Participation(-1) 0.196 0.192 0.277
(0.047) (0.035) (0.038)
R
2 0.312 0.552 0.585
SSR 7059 618 469
# countries 108 108 108
# country-events 1455 1151 964Table 6 – Medal counts with event-specific intercepts
Dependent variable is the percentage medal share (gold, silver, and bronze);
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist represents the social legal system, French the French Civil Law system,
Scandinavian the Scandinavian Civil Law system, German the German Civil Law
System;
USA = dummy-variable representing the USA;
USSR = dummy-variable representing the Soviet Union;
Participation = percentage athletes sent by a country;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 2.339 0.154 -1.448
(0.849) (0.816) (0.656)
Socialist 0.875 0.759 0.619
(0.123) (0.121) (0.126)
Scandinavian 0.523 0.312 0.298
(0.126) (0.124) (0.143)
French 0.007 -0.150 -0.097
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
German 0.389 0.574 0.528
(0.188) (0.186) (0.220)
USA 16.043 9.387 6.432
(1.144) (0.897) (0.994)
USSR 16.474 11.983 9.010
(1.124) (0.794) (1.023)
Participation 0.754 0.900 0.989
(0.101) (0.097) (0.126)
R
2 0.855 0.850 0.808
SSR 6518 3868 3850
# countries 118 118 118
# country-events 1408 1408 1408Table 7 – Medal counts after World War II – Event-specific intercepts
Dependent variable is the percentage medal share (gold, silver, and bronze);
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist represents the social legal system, French the French Civil Law system,
Scandinavian the Scandinavian Civil Law system, German the German Civil Law
System;
USA = dummy-variable representing the USA;
USSR = dummy-variable representing the Soviet Union;
Participation = percentage athletes sent by a country;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 1.143 -0.671 -2.247
(1.065) (1.102) (0.642)
Socialist 0.817 0.707 0.507
(0.127) (0.125) (0.109)
Scandinavian 0.276 0.042 -0.011
(0.120) (0.117) (0.127)
French 0.059 -0.115 -0.044
(0.046) (0.049) (0.048)
German 0.192 0.394 0.210
(0.162) (0.161) (0.166)
USA 14.124 8.584 4.883
(1.242) (0.933) (0.746)
USSR 16.902 11.825 8.768
(1.360) (0.836) (1.131)
Participation 0.925 1.032 1.192
(0.058) (0.052) (0.051)
R
2 0.859 0.848 0.817
SSR 2607 1605 1529
# countries 118 118 118
# country-events 1114 1114 1114Table 8 – Medal counts - Country-specific effects
Dependent variable is the percentage medal share (gold, silver, and bronze);
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Participation = percentage athletes sent by a country;
Log(GDP/POP) = log of GDP per capita share (percentages of total GDP per capita);
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A – All Games 1896-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 4.881 3.211 2.318
(1.078) (1.482) (0.940)
Participation 0.488 0.735 0.615
(0.082) (0.092) (0.188)
Log(GDP/POP) 0.527 0.203 0.173
(0.092) (0.070) (0.053)
R
2 0.677 0.910 0.853
SSR 4424 2564 3855
# countries 72 72 72
# country-events 613 613 613
Panel B – Games 1896-1936
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 8.037 5.833 2.728
(2.627) (2.301) (1.758)
Participation 0.464 0.722 0.607
(0.117) (0.092) (0.166)
Log(GDP/POP) 1.341  0.355 0.508
(0.140) (0.128) (0.110)
R
2 0.704 0.815 0.849
SSR 1574 1093 1643
# countries 72 38 38
# country-events 613 209 209Panel C – Games 1948-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 3.965 2.525 2.322
(1.073) (1.849) (1.184)
Participation 0.493 0.737 0.603
(0.113) (0.133) (0.173)
Log(GDP/POP) 0.513 0.214 0.123
(0.107) (0.088) (0.070)
R
2 0.718 0.899 0.823
SSR 2051 1549 2202
# countries 72 72 72
# country-events 404 404 404
Panel D – Games 1988-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 0.857 0.369 2.585
(0.779) (1.675) (0.543)
Participation 0.553 0.382 0.409
(0.027) (0.053) (0.045)
Log(GDP/POP) 0.995 1.115 0.004
(0.158) (0.237) (0.057)
R
2 0.731 0.889 0.767
SSR 302 175 309
# countries 72 72 72
# country-events 195 195 195Table 9 – Medal counts and TV-sets - Country-specific effects
Dependent variable is the percentage medal share (gold, silver, and bronze);
Home advantage = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Participation = percentage athletes sent by a country;
Log(GDP/POP) = log of GDP per capita share (percentages of total GDP per capita);
TV-sets = number of TV-sets per capita;
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Games 1960-1992
Gold Silver Bronze
Home advantage 3.928 1.827 -0.529
(0.481) (0.463) (0.432)
Participation 0.124 0.285 0.485
(0.018) (0.031) (0.055)
Log(GDP/POP) 0.031 0.010 0.057
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
TV-sets 0.266 0.530 0.062
(0.025) (0.034) (0.038)
R
2 0.800 0.866 0.841
SSR 1122 535 541
SSR (without TV-sets) 1556 699 600
# countries 92 92 92
# country-events 625 625 625